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Before:  AMBRO, FISHER, and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 






AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Derrick Jackson was convicted by a jury of bribery, wire fraud, knowing disclosure of 
contractor bid information, and conspiracy.  After a trial, he filed a motion for judgment 
of acquittal or for a new trial on grounds that (1) the jury returned an inconsistent verdict 
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and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for disclosure and 
conspiracy.  The District Court denied his motion.  Following sentencing, Jackson 
appealed. 1
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment 
of acquittal.  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, “[o]ur 
review of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is guided by strict principles of 
  We now affirm. 
I. 
Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary for our 
decision.  In March 2008, Jackson was indicted for using his official position to secure 
Government contracts for Computer Giants, an information technology company, in 
exchange for payments of cash, gift cards, and computer equipment.  The indictment 
charged Jackson with the crimes noted at the outset of this opinion, and he pleaded not 
guilty to each. 
 While the jury convicted Jackson on all counts of the indictment, it concluded that 
bribery and wire fraud were not objects of the conspiracy.  Following the trial, Jackson 
filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial.  The District Court denied the 
motion, and thereafter sentenced Jackson to concurrent terms of 60 months’ 
imprisonment, three years of supervised release, an $80,000 restitution order, and special 
assessments.  Jackson now appeals the Court’s denial of his motion. 
II. 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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deference to a jury’s verdict.  We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the [G]overnment and must sustain a jury’s verdict if ‘a reasonable jury believing the 
[G]overnment’s evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the [G]overnment 
proved all the elements of the offenses.’”  United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162-63 
(3d Cir. 1997).   
Jackson makes two arguments on appeal.  First, he contends that his convictions 
for bribery and wire fraud should be vacated because they are inconsistent with the 
finding of the jury that neither was an object of the conspiracy.  He concedes that the 
seminal cases on verdict inconsistencies rejected defendants’ claims that their convictions 
should be vacated on this ground.  See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984); 
United States v. Dunn, 284 U.S. 390 (1932); United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  However, he analogizes to United States v. Morales, in which the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit overturned a verdict where the jury found the defendant 
guilty of conspiracy to misapply money but not of the underlying offense.  677 F.2d 1, 3 
(1st Cir. 1982) (relying on a “narrow exception” to the general rule that “actual or 
apparent inconsistency is no basis for setting it aside”).   
The problem for Jackson is that the First Circuit no longer recognizes the rule of 
Morales.  United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In light of the 
reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), . . . we conclude that the rule of 
consistency embraced by Morales is no longer good law.”).   In addition, the reasoning of 
Morales fails here.  In that case, the Court reversed the jury verdict because 
misapplication of funds was an essential element of the conspiracy, and “a jury’s 
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acquittal on substantive counts constitutes a determination that no overt act took place.”  
Morales, 677 F.2d at 3.  Our case presents exactly the opposite situation.  Here, the jury 
found Jackson guilty of bribery and wire fraud, but not of conspiracy to commit the same.  
Because conspiracy is not an element of bribery or wire fraud, Morales does not apply. 
 Jackson also argues that the record contains insufficient evidence from which a 
rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
disclosure of confidential bid information or conspiracy to disclose such information and 
to commit theft.  We disagree.  The Government has pointed to substantial evidence, 
including the testimony of two witnesses, that Jackson knowingly provided information 
to Computer Giants with the intent to give it a comparative advantage in the bidding 
process.2
                                              
2 Specifically, two witnesses testified that they, along with Jackson, agreed to participate 
in the plan to provide “inside bids” to Computer Giants at a meeting in a New York City 
restaurant.  They also testified that, subsequent to that meeting, Jackson sent at least three 
such inside bids to Computer Giants via e-mail, which it later used to underbid 
competitors and win Government contracts.   
  The same evidence supports the conspiracy conviction for disclosure of 
confidential bid information.   As for conspiracy to commit theft, four witnesses testified 
that Jackson stole items from his Government employer’s stock room and, with the help 
of another individual, ordered items though his employer for his personal use.  This 
evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on these charges. 
*    *    *    *    *  
 In this context, we affirm. 
